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The way business is shaped by conventional norms and 
controlled by legal regulation has been the object of much 
investigation. Neo-institutional studies have offered in-
depth inquiries into organizations to show how accepted 
social conventions modulate competition and the interac-
tions between economic partners within the business 
world (Rizza 2008). Economics of convention (in short EC), 
despite its difference with neo-institutional approaches 
(Favereau 2011), has insisted on the importance of these 
conventions (Diaz-Bone/Thévenot 2010), to understand the 
models of firms, the stock market exchanges, the function-
ing of market professionals or recruitment. This has also 
proven true concerning the practices of accounting and 
business management (Hopwood/Miller 1994; Chap-
man/Cooper/Miller 2009; Chiapello/Gilbert 2009). More 
recently, economic sociology as EC had developed their 
interest for the role of law and the articulation between 
conventions and legal rules. Swedberg (2009) introduce 
comments to a special issue of this newsletter, proposing 
two topics that need to be better understood, Roman law 
and financial law, two legal environments that we develop 
exactly in our contribution. Towards EC and derivating 
from the observation that firms are not legally grounded 
(contrary to societies and labor), recent works develops the 
necessity to rethink the great deformation of firms, their 
legal responsibility and who own them (Favereau 2012). 
Other works analyze the role of intermediaries as lawyers 
or judges, and how such specific professional markets are 
working or transformed in last years (on business lawyers, 
see Bessy 2012 in this issue). 
The aim of this study is thus to examine the often over-
looked and yet essential category of forensic expert wit-
nesses in accounting, finance and business management 
known in France as French forensic experts in economics 
(”FFEE”). As professionals in business litigation, these ex-
perts are regularly appointed for business valuations, asset 
accounting and profitability analyses, inquiries into part-
nership disputes and business misconducts, criminal finan-
cial flows tracking, such as unfair competition: their reports 
are summoned to inform and advise judges on the facts 
underlying a business dispute. Because they are regularly 
appointed by the judges1 and provide, directly or not, an 
assessment of the fairness of business practices, this paper 
will show that FFEE are also key players in the definition of 
the conventions governing business in France. They are not 
only specialists inscribing an expertise within a specific field 
of Justice. They are at the very heart of business and al-
ready have a professional activity as accountants, statutory 
auditors, finance managers, and so on. By focusing on 
FFEE and their activities, this study illuminates the role and 
practices of unknown but key actors, symbolizing typically 
“intermediaries of law” highlighted by the contributions in 
Bessy, Delpeuch and Pélisse (2011) and participating to the 
elaboration and transformation of business and judicial 
conventions. 
1. Methods, data, theoretical framework 
To analyze who the accredited forensic experts really are 
and what they really do, several methods and types of data 
were used in an initial comparative study on forensic ex-
pert witnesses in economics, psychiatry and linguistics 
(Pélisse/Charrier/Larchet/Protais 2012). Sent to nearly 1000 
FFEE identified through the 35 lists of the appeal courts 
and the supreme court, a detailed questionnaire was re-
turned by 144 experts. Regarding the information readily 
available on the lists concerning the age, sex, seniority and 
location of all the accredited experts in finance economics 
of France, these 15% appear as broadly representative of 
the whole. 
A second type of data was obtained through extensive 
interviews with 15 experts on the lists of the appeal courts 
of Aix-en-Provence, Lille, Lyon, Paris and Versailles. Five 
judges, three of them were responsible for the experts 
listed by the appeal court, were also interviewed to gather 
the views of the courts. 
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We used the theoretical framework of the EC to illuminate 
these data. Indeed, this perspective allows us to under-
stand how, in each trial and mission, FFEE have to manage, 
help and equip the ways one or many conventions “pass a 
test” and contribute to the evolution, stabilization or 
changes of the convention(s). In this sense, forensics in 
economics are not only intermediaries. They are also active 
mediators between the judge and the parties and the aims 
of this paper is to enter into the ways they assume and 
develop this role which transforms them as depositary of 
conventions of business (for the judge) but also conven-
tions of justice (for the litigants). In this sense, this position 
makes forensics in economics more than a filter and rather 
a turntable and an analytical key entry point to study the 
intertwined business and judicial conventions of economic 
life, if we consider conventions as “general principles of 
good and fair, grounded in provisions which allow to eval-
uate situations” (Eymard-Duvernay 2009). 
2. The French legal forensic model: a lack of 
conventions? 
For over two centuries now, judges in France have relied 
on specialists in economics, commerce and finance, to 
answer their queries and help them determine economic 
facts under litigation (Charrier 2007; Charrier/Labelle 
2009). In 1913, these specialists formed an association of 
forensic accountants next to the Trial Court of the Seine, 
before forging several other associations, such as the large-
ly dominant national association of forensic accountants 
(CNECJ), the national association of forensic experts in 
business and technical services (CNEACT) or the national 
association of experts in finance and business auditing 
(CNEFD). As Dumoulin (2007) has clearly shown, the activi-
ty of the members of these associations is largely codified 
by law. The rule of law is thus the first influence on the 
practices of forensic witnessing, since it builds the institu-
tional framework of forensics and defines the ideal expert. 
In the German context, all forensic experts are civil serv-
ants. In general, in the Anglo-Saxon context, each party 
provides their own experts. Because of this, the legal 
framework of forensic witnessing in France is considered as 
very specific (Jasanoff/Lynch 1998; Prichard 2005; La-
belle/Saboly 2008; Charrier/Escobosa/Leclerc 2011). In-
deed, it articulates the continental position, which relies on 
expertise initiated, controlled and conducted solely for the 
benefit of a judge, while at the same time depending on 
an accredited pool of specialists from each area of exper-
tise that a judge may require. The three main features of 
this unique system emerge from the texts of the various 
codes framing French procedures and justice (Moussa 
2008; Dumoulin 2007). 
The first feature is that forensic experts are, above all, 
technicians, hired to assist judges on technical and non-
legal issues. Because they have the adequate specialized 
and scientific knowledge, they are able to forward learned 
opinions and to collect, organize and assess information, 
by adequately managing the evidence adduced by the 
complainants and defendants. Unlike Anglo-Saxon experts, 
however, they cannot make a profession out of treating 
the financial aspects of litigation. 
The second feature concerns the existence of lists of ex-
perts, from which judges can freely draw. Every year, the 
French courts of appeals compile and update these lists, 
accrediting for five years specialists by field of activity: medi-
cine, construction, psychiatry, economy & finance, etc.; and 
then by sub-specialty: neurology, acoustics or corporate 
finance, for example. Anglo-Saxon experts, on the other 
hand, do their best to be identified by lawyers, even if they 
cultivate objectivity and technical competence to be admit-
ted as genuine forensic experts, and not just as witnesses 
before a judge (Dwyer 2008). 
The third important feature concerns the extremely detailed 
jurisprudential and procedural framework within which 
forensic examinations are to be carried out. Without detail-
ing the whole procedure here, one can note that, at the 
term of their missions, FFEE must submit a report to the 
judge. In civil and criminal cases alike, these reports are 
theoretically purely informational: they may be brought to 
bear witness during a trial or they may be purely and simp-
ly shelved. Moreover, the experts are not commissioned to 
attempt to reconcile the parties involved, even though 
their work may eventually do so. Again, the situation of 
Anglo-Saxon experts differs: most of their work takes place 
in court, while they are publicly supporting their reports or 
answering the questions of the adverse party during cross-
examination. 
Finally, a series of normative texts draw up a model for 
forensic expertise, which typically resembles the “decision-
ist” model of expertise defined by Habermas (1978). 
“Based on an axiological divide between the one who 
decides and the one who advises, and taking for granted 
the subordination of the second to the first, it has become 
an archetypal form, a sort of pre-theory spontaneously 
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mobilized to describe forensic expertise and more broadly 
any kind of expertise” notes Dumoulin (2007, p. 26). At a 
European level too, as goes to show a decision by the 
Court of Justice of the European Community (Penajora, 
March 17, 2011), forensic experts are plainly defined as 
experienced service providers. Such definitions keep exper-
tise under strict control, by ultimately imposing an absolute 
subordination of all experts to their missions. 
In sum, what draws the legal framework of expertise in 
France is an expert who help the judge by illuminating the 
facts – and only the facts –, without any role of qualifica-
tion neither interpretation. In this view, there is finally no 
conventions in this activity, which is absolutely framed by 
the rule of law, letting to the expert a sole technical exper-
tise grounded on his professional skills and his specific 
knowledge of accountant, finance manager or economist. 
3. A practical and ambiguous status oscillating 
between various representations 
Yet, as L. Dumoulin (2007) has also shown, the model 
represented in the legal texts, supported by the expecta-
tions of magistrates and by the expert associations, is nei-
ther empirically nor heuristically valid. Indeed, FFEE neces-
sarily express, more or less openly, several technical op-
tions, which are also choices having conventional back-
ground. The missions resulting of trials are peculiar occa-
sions for the specialist of accounting or economy appoint-
ed by a judge to open the black boxes that are the figures 
or other measures considered as objectiving or describing 
the reality of firms or business relations. Experts have to 
seek information, evaluate their relevance, put to test them 
and make numbers talk, even unmask realities beyond 
arguments and columns of figures. In other words, FFEE 
express the conventional nature of the management tools 
and the reductionist operation, which transmutes reality 
into figures. 
By making this activity, FFEE import value judgments, 
which have several possible effects. They have to present 
written reports characterized by neutrality. For that, they 
conclude often their demonstration by relating two or 
more options for the judge, letting him the decision, even if 
the experts can highlight or even influence one reasoning 
more than one other. Experts stage-manage their neutrality 
by presenting the plurality of possible judgments depending 
how they consider the facts, e.g how they interpret them 
and the information they have for their mission. 
As to the judges, though they are indeed the only judges 
and are in no way legally bound by the expertise, they are 
nonetheless dependent of the reports they have commis-
sioned and are submitted, at least in part, to the authority 
of science and specialized knowledge. The conventional 
role of forensic in economics is thus not only inscribed in 
their activity but also real through the influence they could 
have on the judge, that is to say on the judicial decision 
and finally the law. 
Even the recent and important decision of Penajora men-
tioned above reveals more ambiguous than the simple 
expression of the decisionnist model of expertise. Indeed, 
the European Court of Justice questioned if the French 
forensic expert could influence the judicial verdict of the 
judge. Its negative answer is explicitly due to Mr. Penajora 
specialty (translator and interpreter), which is, for the main 
experts and judges, not real legal experts (see chapter 4 
written by Larchet in Pélisse 2012). In other words, the 
question is of great interest for main forensic experts, show-
ing that their participation to the verdict needs to be assert-
ed, despite the codes prohibitions of such possibility. The 
present status of forensics is thus really debated, revealing 
how various conventions could regulate this activity. 
It follows that the general figure of FFEE oscillates between 
two opposite representations. The first and most common 
is that of a technical specialist, a connoisseur of the habits 
and customs of his art, a provider of skills for the benefit of 
justice. From the perspective of legal specialists (Frison-
Roche/Mazeaud 1995), the “decisionist” model leads to 
identifying the expert as a fair-minded professional, anx-
ious to serve the institution. The second common represen-
tation of the expert is that of a judge’s delegate, a person 
in charge of the resolution of the dispute from a technical 
perspective. From this point of view, the FFEE conclusion 
settles the factual dispute between the parties. Experts can 
thus be accused of usurping the role of the judge and 
benefit from the legitimacy of the judiciary. They become 
notables, identified by their unique social position rather 
than their professional skills. 
Such opposing representations are of particular importance 
when it comes to specialists in accounting, management 
and finance. Indeed, is it not said today that finance gov-
erns society? Even the law and its institutions must today 
be economically efficient. This economic rationale implies 
that every decision, every ruling has a cost – if not a price – 
and is thus of the competence of accountants. It can be 
imagined that FFEE could play the first role within the ex-
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pert/judge couple. To rise these opposite representations 
or even fears, the perspective of EC could exactly be fruit-
ful. Indeed, it offers theoretical concepts, tools and reason-
ing which allow to understand what are doing concretely 
the experts, how they play a role of intermediary and ac-
tive contributor of the conventions, if we define them as 
“collective frameworks upon which the players are sup-
ported in their conflicts and assessments in public” (Diaz-
Bone/Thévenot 2010). Experts influence particularly the 
ways legal compliance is considered, defined, and used by 
the parties and the judges (Edelman/Stryker 2005). Be-
cause the sense of compliance is intertwined between 
business sphere and legal norms, forensics in economics 
are discrete but key actors, with others, whose contribute 
to the managerialization of the law and the legalization of 
the business (Edelman 2011). But what are concretely 
doing the experts? 
4. What are experts doing? From a business to a craft 
The judicial missions given to FFEE are various, though 
most involve monitoring and verifying the standards of 
business relations. Three main types of mission thus struc-
ture the activity of FFEE. 
The first one consists in establishing the accounts between 
litigious parties; that is to say, to observe and quantify the 
liabilities of both. Such missions can require a high level of 
technical accounting, such as when quantifying the respec-
tive business activity of partner companies. 33% to 50% 
of all missions fall into this category (including or not di-
vorce and inheritance cases) and ¾ of the experts report-
ing it as 1 out of 2 appointments by year. This first type of 
mission should be distinguished from another type, which 
essentially calls for the intervention of an accountant: this 
is the case in 5.4% of missions during which FFEE are 
summoned to comment on the quality of annual accounts. 
Missions tracing financial flows likely to be of a criminal 
nature (abuse of corporate assets) are a third type, repre-
senting 2.5% of cases. It is thus already obvious that mis-
sions requiring pure accountancy skills represent but a 
minority of all missions, yet accountants represent the 
majority of the experts engaged in forensic economics (see 
below). These forensic missions can be highly complex 
affairs, which reach into the very heart of the business 
world. An expertise and its conclusions thus contribute to 
the definition of the standards of good business conduct 
and to how conflicts between parties can be resolved. 
Yet, in 1 out of 3 cases, experts are commissioned to com-
pute economic damage due to partnership dissolutions, 
industrial incidents, family disputes, construction litiga-
tions, unfair competition and so on. This type of mission, 
during which financial specialists contend with account-
ants, is at the heart of expertise. More explicitly than in the 
“settling the accounts between parties” type of mission, 
experts must enquire into the way business strategies are 
managed, can be predicted, are anticipated, are built. 
Auditing of companies represents the last and least fre-
quent type of mission commissioned by judges (13%). This 
involves the possible intervention of several competing 
groups of experts, each offering a different way of broach-
ing business valuation. The perception the judges have of 
such cases and their judicial decisions will thus depend on 
the specializations and particular competencies of the 
experts involved and on the ways and means of their au-
dits. But, most of the time, what makes a difference – and 
also clearly indicates what is expected of experts in general 
–, has less to do with the specific professional abilities of 
experts in accounting or those in finance, than to the skills 
and knowledge that either can have. 
Like for forensic accountant in common law, skills and 
activities needed for these missions are not those that the 
professionals make use of most in their usual professional 
activities. As shows the way judges appoint indifferently 
specialized experts, the real skills expected from FFEE have 
very little to do with their professions. In other words, 
different and specific conventions are used and performed 
by accountants and auditors when acting as legal experts. 
For example, timeliness is of importance, as 40-hour mis-
sions can take up to 18 months to accomplish. According 
to FFEE having answered the questionnaire, a quarter of all 
missions last between 4 and 6 months, while another 
quarter last between 13 to 18 months, and this regardless 
of the number of hours of the mission itself. This spread in 
time implies strict scheduling, requiring from the expert a 
capacity to build, stick and report an agenda that depends 
largely on the attitudes of litigious parties, and not, as in 
accountancy and auditing activities, on predictable season 
from one year to the next. Beyond their technical 
knowledge and regardless of their professional skills as 
accountants, auditors, managers in banking or finance, 
experts must also have organizational, procedural and 
relational skills and knowledge. 
These skills are different from those required in profession-
al context: accountants keep and organize accounts, assist 
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companies in implementing the good management and 
legality of its daily practice, develop budgets and forecasts, 
book annual accounts of corporations, audit them, and so 
on. It is a very organized occupation, which uses software 
tools and paper procedures, framed by standard attitudes 
and tasks and guaranteed by the periodic quality controls 
of the order of accountants (Ramirez 2005). It is also an 
occupation that “produces” without the need for much 
contact with clients. Moreover, though accountants must 
be able to justify their recommendations in the face of the 
law, their work remains somewhat opaque. This is also 
true for auditing, an activity occupied by most accountants 
and forensic experts. Auditing is even more “invisible” 
than accounting and even more standardized and empow-
ering, and is in no way limited to certifying accounts, or 
sitting on board meetings. The time scales of their mis-
sions, destined to reach their term with an audit report or 
the closing of the accounts, are also very marked. The high 
degree of normalization, the importance of technical and 
computer-assisted accounting and auditing tools, the re-
sponsibilities of these professionals who have an obligation 
of discretion concerning their work, encourage the de-
ployment of a bureaucratic organization and industrial 
conventions. Set methods, the division of labour, delega-
tion, reporting are the daily means of the professional 
practice of such experts in their main activity (Power 1997). 
Experts involved in management, business valuation or 
finance, know all about these issues and some are even 
engaged in similar industrialized organizations during their 
usual professional activities. 
Forensic expertise, on the other hand, is quite different. In 
the French legal system, the accused must be able to con-
tradict the allegations they face, transforming any expertise 
into a collective affair, led by the commissioned expert, but 
influenced by the lawyers of the parties or the parties 
themselves. Indeed, experts depend wholly on information 
that the parties are willing to give them. Moreover, the 
contradictory principle requires dialogue. Experts, even 
though preceded by their reputations or experience, are 
under the obligation to hear the arguments exchanged, to 
explain their own reasoning and to specify the sources of 
the usages they base their recommendations on. Each and 
every mission is conditioned by situations, which are abso-
lutely unique. This uniqueness is also true in the eyes of the 
law and is guaranteed by the involvement of lawyers sup-
porting their customers. In forensic matters, unlike account-
ing, only the objective is known at the onset of the mission, 
the means of achieving this goal is not normalized. 
Consequently, forensic matters are difficult to delegate, as 
all missions require in-depth knowledge of a technical 
field, practical experience and the ability to enter the judi-
cial arena. Communication skills could well be the key to 
FFEE, who must be able to skillfully handle requests for 
extensions in deadlines or for further financial support, 
when briefing judges on the opposite claims and in order 
to secure the payment of their own fees. Recourse to a 
court order, when a party is recalcitrant to transmit the 
information required, is not, however, a common practice. 
26% did say they resorted to a judge’s summons, while 
56% stated explicitly that they refused to do so. Finally, 
the specific technical, procedural and social skills, necessary 
to any forensic activity implies that FFEE are personally 
invested in the management of their missions: they are the 
master craftsmen appointed by judges. In other words, as 
their professional milieu is governed by the logic of the 
industrial convention and requirements, FFEE are rather 
engaged in a regime (in the sense developed by Thévenot 
2006) mixing the logic of the domestic convention domi-
nated by personal commitment or even tradition, and the 
logic of the network convention where specific, relational, 
and procedural more than economics skills are very im-
portant to obtain missions, be commissioned by judges 
and influence business and judicial ways used to solve 
conflicts. 
5. Who are experts? A milieu crossed by professional 
conventions 
To understand the conventional roles and the conventions 
structuring this milieu of experts itself, it is thus necessary 
to describe sociologically, even if shortly, these profession-
als. Despite variegated individual trajectories and differing 
stakes within the worlds of finance, accounting and man-
agement in economics, forensic experts form a relatively 
homogeneous group. They are generally accountants, who 
have had some form of legal training during their higher 
education: 71% of FFEE are marked as specializing in ac-
counting, and more than 1 in 5 of those having answered 
the questionnaire had some form of legal education. The 
strong dominance of accountants is accompanied by a 
certain uniformity in the individual profiles in terms of 
gender (91% are male), age (the average age is 57) and 
qualifications (most had postgraduate degrees, 4 or 5 years 
of higher education, and some even had a PhD). Finally, 
the forensic experts questioned work, for their vast majori-
ty, in an independent practice (86%), removed from all 
technical networks or associations (77%), employing fewer 
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than 10 people and with a small turnover (51%). The clien-
tele of these practices is qualified as nondescript (79%), 
generally consisting of small or very small businesses 
(64%), most of which were family run (61%). There are, 
however, some experts employed by bigger companies, 
financial institutions, or academic institutions. These are 
mainly the experts in finance, who operate in such envi-
ronments as senior executives or managers specialized in a 
banking or actuarial activity. Some experts also mentioned 
a clientele of very large groups and international compa-
nies (23%) and 17% of them reported belonging to a 
consortium of law firms (4%) or to a network (13%). 
The field of financial experts in common law countries 
differs from the one identified. Working naturally within a 
team and organizing their work according to their special-
ties and not as a secondary activity, forensic accountants 
are specialists within a professional group, rather than a 
caste within a professional body (Williams 2002). On the 
contrary, being a FFEE is, for the vast majority of all ex-
perts, a secondary activity, incidental to a main occupation. 
Only a few experts, often accredited by the French su-
preme court, are engaged in a greater number of missions 
and at a much larger scale than average. They have made 
themselves known by engaging in the transmission (train-
ing) and management (associations) of the know-how and 
social networks of their specialty and they have banked on 
accreditation by a public authority. These common traits to 
the actors of FFEE promote certain mimetic practices, im-
posed by the formal distance maintained between judges 
and experts, and by a small set of technical procedures 
shared by all forensic experts. Expert associations, bringing 
together more than two out of three FFEE, play a role in 
the matter, by filling in the uncertainty in which experts are 
left concerning the expectations of the law. Skills are 
shared and to some extent formalized, but most 
knowledge is transmitted during regularly held informal 
exchanges among peers, and sometimes in the presence of 
magistrates, by these associations. 
Finally, we see the necessity of conventions at three stages 
of this activity of FFEE. The legal framework, even if it for-
mally prescribes a very strict decisionnist model subordinat-
ing totally the experts to the judge, doesn’t allow for un-
derstanding the real activity of FFEE and actual, even un-
known, influence on the trial, its temporality, argumenta-
tive structuration or, sometimes, final decision. In other 
words, informal but structured conventions are used by the 
judges (in the formulation of their mission and what they 
are waiting) as the experts (in their actual activities and 
how they write their reports) to use the expertise at the 
benefit of the judicial truth and close  litigation. One can 
thus understand the conventional way adopted by the 
judge to choose whose expert he needs from the FFEE list, 
that is to say why the judges appoint embedded and well-
known professional in the milieu of forensic expertise. 
Through this social milieu and its very shortly description, 
we show finally how the conventions and the definition of 
what is legal compliance, at the intersection of business 
worlds and judicial institutions, are diffusing between FFEE 
and from them to the judges. In sum, forensics in econom-
ics bears and translates business conventions to the judges 
and help these conventions to be reinterpreting in terms of 
judicial decision. But they translate also reciprocally judicial 
conventions towards the world of business. 
6. Conventions at work: the forensic translator’s role 
from business conventions toward judicial decision… 
and reciprocally 
Indeed, the first movement described above is more or less 
evident, even if we show how and through what sort of 
mediation or mechanisms (like actual activity very different 
of the classical activity of the professional or a very singular 
social milieu), the business conventions are translated into 
the judicial world of trial and rules of law. But what we aim 
at showing to conclude is the reciprocal role developed by 
FFEE to translate the judicial conventions into the business 
world, during the “little trial” which is the expertise. 
Expertise is the time for dialogue between the expert, the 
parties and lawyers in the identification of appropriate 
financial evidence. But it is also a doubt period: sometimes 
the expert is faced with a dilemma when he “feels” tech-
nically the damage, but at the same time he thinks that the 
trial rules will not favor the "victim." For example (coming 
from personal survey of one of the authors, involved in the 
field), a publisher wrongfully terminated the contract bind-
ing him to an advertising agency. A lower court and then 
an appellate court conclude that such a termination was 
wrongful. A chartered accountant is given a mission to 
quantify the increase in customers contractually promised, 
and to estimate the loss suffered by the advertising agen-
cy. The expert calls numerous meetings notably because 
the conduct of the expertise is slowed by delays, due either 
to the agency (reluctant to disclose detailed forecasts and 
information concerning its sector of activity) or to the edi-
tor (who only provided figures, when summoned to do so, 
on the years under its new advertising agency). To over-
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come the blockage, the expert directed questions straight 
to the trade association, which circulates very general in-
formation. During the meetings, the expert presents tables 
with the information he has managed to gather, noting 
their deficiencies, and commenting at each time what he 
has had to deduce. During the final meeting, the expert 
explains that ultimately, the advertising agency had hardly 
uncovered any customers under the terms of the contract 
but that it had managed to very quickly compensate this 
loss in profits after the contract was broken. The discussion 
at this meeting is very heated, the advertising agency not-
ing that the publisher would not be punished for his 
wrongful termination on the grounds that the agency had 
managed to cope with the incident. After final submis-
sions, the Expert concludes that there was virtually no loss 
of benefit for the agency, given the way its affairs devel-
oped afterwards. But his report also assessed, in case the 
court was interested solely in the contractual relationship 
between the parties, which benefits the agency might have 
made had such benefits not escaped it. 
This example identifies several characteristics of financial 
expertise. Indeed one can see the expert asks the meth-
odological framework in which he asks the parties to prove 
their claim. He leads them by this methodological frame-
work to do calculations and document their claims against 
a judicial perspective that takes into account the economic 
knowledge of the company. The expert has also led to 
implement pro-active means for collecting information 
despite reluctance of the parties: there are characteristics 
of the managerial dimension of expertise and the fact that 
the expert works anymore by methodological means than 
by technical means. The debate at the last meeting also 
reveals the gap that can exist between an economical 
approach (market convention) and a judicial approach 
(civic convention), which is driven by the legal expert. In-
deed the expert assessed that the victim made losses be-
cause of the guilty according to financial criteria, he also 
quantified that the victim was able to achieve such profits 
despite the fault of the guilty. The expert, in charge of 
legal dimensions, links the losses and profits that the victim 
realized, with respect to a unique enterprise perspective. 
As a result the expert notes that the victim did not suffer 
injury. Nevertheless it is a form of windfall to the guilty 
because the victim was initially damaged and was able to 
compensate by reorganizing its firm. And we notice that 
the expert, perhaps uncomfortable with this situation, 
chooses to report the judge what would be the loss quan-
tum if the judge was sticking to the only relationship be-
tween the two parties, without taking into account the 
ability that the victim had to cope with the injury suffered. 
This case reveals thus how the forensic expert is not only 
about informing the judge with business conventions (fi-
nancial losses and profits); but also about guiding parties 
with judicial conventions or the civic convention (enterprise 
compensation). And this role of guidance is perhaps as 
important as the information for the judge: we have in-
deed to remember that judges are always free to reject the 
analyses and conclusions of the commissioned experts. 
Dumoulin (2007) has stressed the strategic use that judges 
make of forensic reports, which involves an ability to “pick 
and choose”, undermining the apparent influence of fo-
rensic experts. Moreover, by law, very few experts receive a 
copy of the ruling following their reports. 
Finally, as mentioned by FFEE in the questionnaires and 
interviews and confirmed by the judges, contacts between 
judges and experts during missions are rare. These are 
limited almost exclusively to procedural issues concerning 
the confidentiality of certain documents, the reluctance of 
a party to provide necessary information, a discussion on 
the scope of the mission, the deadline and budget of the 
expertise. All the technical issues are left to FFEE. Thus, 
though experts know that they are acting on behalf and 
under the supervision of judges, they also understand that 
this control does not concern their technical expertise, and 
that this will generally not be commented by the judge, 
whether the latter is satisfied or not. FFEE are thus quite 
free to fulfill their missions, as they feel fit. Is this not, 
however, how one distinguishes an expert from a very 
knowledgeable person: the fact that he or she is also ca-
pable of bringing interlocutors to an acceptable solution 
without needing to call on the commissioner? 
The story described above has also shown an expert active 
in his relationship intermediation, which suggests another 
argument to the judge giving him the relevant technical 
information. This pro-activity is also observed for market 
damages (an injury that judges seem insensitive and whose 
experts are trying to take over the calculations of the par-
ties) and audit methodology (when expert considers the 
damages evidence from the review of the organization and 
procedures of the company more than through the docu-
mentation of traces). 
We can thus conclude that the conventional dimensions of 
this activity and milieu of expertise are essential to under-
stand how business and justice meets in France. This role 
and this activity are – as other intermediaries – very essential 
to structure and evolve the conventions regulating business 
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relations, particularly when their conflict dimension deports 
the actors to the courts. With a radiating influence, beyond 
mere legal rules governing business relations and also affect 
the current uses, forensics in economics contribute clearly 
to the changing conventions on which economic actors 
can use to interact. 
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Endnotes 
1Following Durand-Barthez and Langlart (2012), the global 
turnover of FFEE exceeds 500 million $ per year. 
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